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Abstract: The paper describes the process of security sector reform in Guatemala with reference to the
efforts to implement community-based policing practices. The results point to the difficulties of shaking-
off public understandings of security honed during the armed conflict and underscore the efforts of a
still young police institution to position itself in a democratic context. The study posits that community-
oriented policing strategies open opportunities to forward police reform in the high-violence, low-trust,
weak-institutions, and post-conflict context of Guatemala. The argument is supported by field data gathered
in indigenous territories in the Western Highlands, where traditional forms of social organization persist,
and in metropolitan Villa Canales municipality, an urban, high-violence site of research.
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1. Introduction
Police reform has been sought in Latin America since au-
thoritarian regimes declined in the late 20th century. In
Guatemala, the peace accords of 1996 ended one of the
longest and most brutal civil wars in the continent in which
more than 200,000 people were killed, 93 per cent at the
hands of the military which carried out a scorched-earth
policy that effectively destroyed the guerrillas’ social support
networks in what amounted to “acts of genocide” against
indigenous groups [1]. During the war the military expanded
its power over all of society controlling the judicial system,
promoting political parties to press for its interests and es-
tablishing a stratum of former officers with multiple business
concerns [2]. In this context the National Police was an in-
strument to suppress opposition which actively participated
in capturing, secluding, torturing and frequently eliminating
actual or alleged members of the resistance.
Police reform was effectively launched in Guatemala
with the creation of the National Civilian Police (PNC, Span-
ish acronym) by the peace accords to replace the conflict-
era security bodies. The accords established that the PNC
would act in full respect of human rights, under the lead-
ership of civilian authorities, and in collaboration with rep-
resentatives of the communities it serves. This was an
essential part of the effort to transform Guatemalan secu-
rity policy from counterinsurgent opprobrium to a human-
security paradigm where the rights of the citizens are the
center of concern of state action.
Regrettably, more than two decades later, those high-
minded objectives have not been achieved. With no
democratic antecedents, under control of venal politi-
cal administrators, with weak administrative structures,
a perennial shortage of funds and always vulnerable to
c© 2021 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published
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pressures to remilitarize, the PNC has struggled to de-
velop into an effective security institution during its 23
years of existence [3].
A state of permanent crisis demands immediate atten-
tion from the police to the manifold aspects of violence
and crime in Guatemala. Economic stagnation and social
neglect from politicians have favored conditions for interper-
sonal violence in the form of common crime on the streets,
or domestic abuse fueled by male chauvinism and alcohol
consumption. Street-gangs manage extortion schemes that
affect enterprises of all sizes and which are many times
enforced through lethal violence. Transnational criminal or-
ganizations operate in Guatemalan territory in cahoots with
local felons running drugs, weapons and human trafficking.
Demands to repress community mobilizations against ex-
tractive industries in cases of badly managed land, water,
and energy conflicts sporadically come about as well.
Despite the obstacles that high levels of internal and
transnational crime, under-resourced and weak institutions,
and the absence of a democratic heritage pose, some fa-
vorable elements for police reform are also in place. An
important reduction in violence levels has been achieved
since 2010, National Civilian Police officers trained during
the conflict-era are ceding leadership positions to a newer
generation, and, as fieldwork for this study shows, there are
elements on which to build trust between communities and
police people deployed in the territories.
Adaptations of community-oriented policing (COP)
strategies that originated in developed countries have been
a part of every major effort at police reform in Latin America
[4]. Guatemala has not been the exception. Dabs at enact-
ing community-oriented strategies that began at the turn
of the century have become more stable since the estab-
lishment of the Integral Community Security Police Model
(MOPSIC, its Spanish acronym) within the PNC in 2014. As
will be described below, the MOPSIC provides tools and es-
tablishes guidelines for the Guatemalan Police to increase
its capacity to relate with communities and cooperate in the
production of secure environments.
The continuity of such strategies is conditioned by the
fact that police reform is more a political than a techno-
cratic issue. In this light, the present article does not intend
to make the point that the path towards reform is sustain-
able and that community-based strategies are warranted in
Guatemala as the commitment of higher-level authorities
has only been sporadic for this to happen. The development
of COP in the Guatemalan PNC has hinged on the work of
rising professionals within the institution combined with inter-
national donor support. The objective of this article, rather,
is to provide evidence that despite the difficulties it faces,
community-oriented policing strategies open some opportu-
nities to forward police reform in the high-violence, low-trust,
weak-institutions, and post-conflict context of Guatemala.
The MOPSIC provides tools, develops knowledge, and
enhances a different understanding among police members
of what their role must be: to protect and serve the pop-
ulation. First and foremost, Guatemala needs its police
force to cease being an aggressor. Fostering cooperative
structures in which “... community [...] takes a lead in es-
tablishing local norms, working with the police, and resolv-
ing internal tensions in ways that promote overall security
while leaving basic law enforcement in the hands of the po-
lice” ([5], pp. 11-12) is a contribution towards these limited
goals. Such institutional evolution contributes to abrade the
authoritarian-militaristic approach to public security that the
Guatemalan state has been based on since its inception.
After the signing of Peace Accords, specialists in the
use of violence that were part of the repressive apparatus
of the military governments transformed into “violent en-
trepreneurs” that have established relations with the new
governing elites in northern Central America and have fre-
quently taken up the highest security posts in these coun-
tries [6]. The continuation of this “militarized culture [,]
inhibits the police’s ability to engage with the community as
public servants rather than as agents of an anxious state”
([7], p. 174). Despite these delays in the democratization
of security and the pressure towards remilitarization they
entail, the Guatemalan PNC has been able to avoid com-
plete over-take. Although besieged, the PNC has kept its
identity as a civilian institution, effort in which the take up of
COP strategies has been an important component. COP
is a contraposition, a counterexample to militarization. It
contributes to civilianize security, increase the possibilities
for citizen oversight, and eventually for the development of
stronger accountability mechanisms. COP strategies are
well positioned to respond to crime concerns based in the
territories inhabited by the affected population, including
domestic, common and even street-gang crime. They have
been instrumental in bringing about a significant decrease
in homicidal violence and several other indicators of crime.
This reasoning arises from the study of the implementa-
tion of COP strategies in two highly differentiated localities
in Guatemala taking into account the experience, attitudes
and opinions of communities and police people deployed
in the territories. The article critically examines the assess-
ment that security sector authorities, international donors
and experts of COP implementation make regarding its
significance for wider police reform as well. The research
reveals that, even if trust is low towards the police, the
community is not fully alienated from it in Guatemala. Ele-
ments of empathy towards each other are in place on which
structures of social cooperation can be built. Sustaining
COP strategies contributes to develop a human-security
approach.
A closer consideration of the circumstances in which
the process has and continues to take place sheds light on
unaccounted-for factors that can invigorate the implementa-
tion of COP and of wider police reform in Guatemala. The
article begins with an overview of the development of the
institution within recent history followed by a presentation
of the material and methods used in the research. Then, it
presents the results of research carried out in two selected
municipalities using Frühling’s framework to assess COP
implementation [4]. The piece ends with an analytical dis-
cussion of the results and provides some conclusions and
recommendations.
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Vignette: Evolution of homicidal violence in Guatemala and its region
A short phase of decrease in the homicide rate that went from 38.2 per every 100,000 inhabitants in 1997 to 24.2 in 1999 was associated to the
establishment of the National Civilian Police. It was followed by an increasingly chaotic period in the first decade of the 21st century marked by
lawlessness instigated by the heightened presence of narcotics trafficking organizations in the Guatemalan territory, the stagnation of social indicators
of well-being, increasing income inequality, growth in the operation of street-gangs mainly in marginal urban neighborhoods accompanied by inept and
inefficacious responses from the security apparatus. From 1999 until 2009 homicide rates grew approximately 7% each year as can be seen in the
graph below. The absolute numbers went from 2,655 homicides in 1999 to 6,498 in 2009. Since then, and correlated with the implementation of
strengthened interinstitutional collaboration in crime investigation strategies, the homicide rate has decreased steadily (Figure 1).
When compared to the most violent of its neighbors, El Salvador and Honduras, with which Guatemala constitutes the so-called “Northern Triangle” of
Central America, what’s most notable is the constant descent in homicide rate levels that Guatemala has sustained since 2009, the volatility of El
Salvador, and the non-coincidence with Honduras’ variations. It is also notable that Mexico can be considered among the most violent countries in the
region since 2017. This shows that the evolution of homicidal violence is mainly determined by national dynamics, not to regional tendencies (Figure 2).
Should Guatemala’s homicide reduction trend continue, it will soon join the group of its low-violence neighbors that sustain homicide levels well below
the Latin American average of 23 per 100,000 inhabitants (Figure 3).
Figure 1. Homicide rates per 100K inhabitants, Guatemala 1996–2019.
Figure 2. Homicide rates per 100K inhabitants Nothern Triangle of Central America and Mexico.
Figure 3. Homicide rates per 100K inhabitants, selected countries.
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1.1. From Counterinsurgency to a Mafia State, and the
Police’s struggle to keep up with the Transformation of
Violence
During the Guatemalan internal armed conflict, military in-
telligence officers devised schemes to fund their repressive
operations tapping into state revenues from customs duties
and other sources. These clandestine structures, or CIACS
[8], as they came to be conceptualized in the peace accords,
expanded into transnational criminal activities and crucially
permeated security and justice institutions, including the
police. They were able to exploit state structures, wield vio-
lence to further their interests and ensure impunity for their
acts. By the end of the war the operation of these “hidden
powers” led Amnesty International to label Guatemala as a
“corporate mafia state” [9].
Denunciations of the massive violations of human rights
that were being committed by the military in the 1980s
eroded international, and crucially United States (U.S.), sup-
port to the Guatemalan government. Rifts within the army
leadership led to a coup d’état, that opened the way for
an elected assembly that sanctioned a new constitution in
1985 and the eventual election of a civilian, Vinicio Cerezo,
as president. The long process of peace negotiations that
ensued reached a definitive peace accord in 1996 which
mandated cutbacks on military power and created the new
police force.
The nascent National Civilian Police (PNC) faced diffi-
culties in setting up its education model. President Alvaro
Arzú(1996–2000) brought the Spanish Civilian Guard to
train the PNC but international experts in the United Nations
humanitarian mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) disagreed
on his choice. Other international donors became involved
in providing support for police training, which gave rise to
disparate results and a lack of clarity in the education model
for the PNC. Problems in recruitment and mismanagement
let conflict-era state security agents join the new PNC, de-
laying the pursued severance with the repressive approach
to security. New recruits received short training courses,
only three months long in some cases, and were paid low
wages.
During President Alfonso Portillo’s administration (2000–
2004) the CIACS transformed into mafia organizations, en-
gaged in national and transnational crime for private profit
and continued to extend their reach, attaining influence
over the processes of appointment of magistrates to high
courts and illegally financing politics. Portillo frequently re-
placed police chiefs and interior ministers and drastically cut
the police academy’s budget. Hardline measures against
street gangs included arbitrary massive incarceration that
alienated poor youth and allowed gangs to expand their ex-
tortion networks while concentrated in prisons from which
they began to operate regularly making use of homicidal
violence to enforce their villainous dictums. Criminal in-
vestigations and crime prevention capacities in the police
remained backward.
Under President Oscar Berger (2004–2008) the rising
trend in homicidal violence accelerated and the PNC’s im-
age plummeted. Members of the police were revealed to
have been involved in the prominent murder of Salvadoran
parliamentarians in Guatemalan soil in 2006, allegedly in a
drug trafficking deal gone wrong. Accusations were lodged
against the Minister of the Interior, the Police Chief and
other high-level security sector authorities for extrajudicial
executions in prisons and “social cleansing” campaigns in
poor neighborhoods. Under the pressure from international
donors that these events brought about, Berger approved
the creation of the International Commission against Im-
punity in Guatemala (CICIG).
Originally proposed by human rights defenders to inves-
tigate CIACS’ attacks against them, the UN-backed CICIG
started operations in 2007. CICIG was set up as a hybrid
investigative unit able to co-prosecute with the Attorney
General’s office through the mechanism of “collaborative
plaintiff”. It pushed forward legal reforms that authorized the
use of special methods of investigation, including wiretaps,
which produced crucial evidence for its cases. During its
12 years of presence in Guatemala it helped to develop
national capacities to investigative and prosecute crime,
including in the police.
President Álvaro Colom (2008–2012) created a Police
Reform commission and appointed Helen Mack, a promi-
nent human-rights defender, as chief. She set out to intro-
duce a police doctrine to break from the inertial tendency
towards a militarized approach, but low budgets hindered
the modernization of the police academy [Interview with He-
len Mack]. Although a meritorious effort, reformists in the
police disdain the fact that an external entity was created
to guide its own affairs [interviews]. Although efforts to de-
velop police relations to the community were still insufficient
by the end of Colom’s government their institutionalization
was closer.
The slow but steady process of professionalization of the
police strengthened a group of reform-minded officers who
pushed forward the development of what would become the
MOPSIC. As Macaulay points out “when domestic actors do
want police reform, long term results are more likely when
it is driven by the police corporations themselves and not
by politicians or technocrats [as] [p]olice pride in their own
professionalism, encouraged both from within the institu-
tion and by policy-makers through training and performance
management, is one of the best ways of reducing politiciza-
tion and meeting complex security agendas” ([10], p. 185).
Even if facing adverse conditions regarding political authori-
ties’ support for reform, it is also true that the Guatemalan
effort to develop COP strategies benefits from the fact that
it has included an in-house component.
CICIG became fully operational and its accompaniment
allowed Guatemalan investigators and prosecutors to carry
out their work with less fear. Under its influence, criminal
investigation was prioritized as security policy to deal with
the complex Guatemalan criminal landscape. Besides the
contributions previously mentioned, the commission pushed
forward the establishment of a witness protection program
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and tighter gun controls. The PNC developed its homicide
investigations unit and opened up to collaboration with a
progressive Attorney General, Claudia Paz y Paz, and CI-
CIG in the implementation of strategic investigations aimed
at dismantling whole criminal structures instead of using
the traditional case by case approach. Making use of mod-
ern criminal intelligence analysis techniques, specialized
software, and strategic penal prosecution, criminal actors
and organizations that make systematic use of homicidal
violence were targeted. International analysts consider the
decrease in impunity these developments implied were cru-
cial in allowing Guatemala to “buck the trend” of increasing
homicide rates by the early 2010’s [2]. Those years also
saw the onslaught of gruesome violence from Mexican drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs), notably the Zetas cartel,
which sought to terrorize the public and governmental forces
to control the drug trade in Guatemala. A series of coordi-
nated actions, that included massive deployment of security
personnel in northern municipalities, eventually ended the
Zeta’s systematic use of harrowing violence, if not their op-
eration in the country, sometimes in collaboration with active
members of the army and the police. Additionally, scores of
criminal groups, mainly murderous extortion rackets, were
broken up through coordinated action. Impunity slowly be-
gan to decrease and subsequently the extraordinary levels
of homicidal violence began to recede.
Even if objective indicators of violence began to fall, it
was by no means enough and the public’s perception of
insecurity continued to grow. This was a major factor in the
election of Otto Pérez, a retired army general, as president
(2012–2015), whose campaign centered on the promise
of a “strong fist” against crime [11]. The UN Secretary
General appointed a new CICIG commissioner, Colombian
Iván Velásquez, in 2013 after Pérez requested the previous
one to be replaced. Once in Guatemala, Velásquez carried
out wide consultations to understand the specificities of
the domestic criminal phenomena. Velásquez’s analysis
pointed towards the need to prioritize investigations against
corruption as he considered it to be the main mechanism
through which the CIACS sustain control over the state
and procure impunity for their criminal actions. This was a
crucial recasting of CICIG’s strategy that would very soon
produce striking outcomes.
In April 2015 CICIG and the Attorney General revealed
a case of tax fraud in the customs agency that involved the
Vice-president’s private secretary. Massive rallies against
the government broke out through the country, at which the
police remained respectful of protesters’ rights and demo-
cratic order. Additional evidence confirmed the public’s sus-
picions of involvement of the highest authorities. It led to
the indictment of the Vice-president and eventually forced
the resignation of President Pérez in September of that year.
Pérez, his vice-president and scores of members of his cabi-
net face multiple charges of corruption in Guatemalan courts
at the time of this article’s publication. The “Guatemalan
Spring”, as these events came to be referred to, showed that
all members of Guatemalan society, no matter how powerful,
can be subjected to the law; that citizen mobilizations can
achieve changes at the highest levels of government and
that justice and security institutions have the capacity to
carry out their missions even under very difficult conditions,
if provided with the necessary support.
In this context the public reacted against traditional politi-
cians by electing Jimmy Morales as president in 2016, a
TV comedian, who ran under the slogan of “not corrupt
nor a thief”. Unfortunately, a cabal of former-military of-
ficers with links to CIACS and bent on fighting-off justice
processes for crimes committed during the armed conflict,
was behind Morales’ candidacy who, although a new face,
was not a reformer of Guatemalan politics. After CICIG
presented charges against Morales’ brother and son in a
corruption case, the president full-heartedly joined power-
ful members of the elite in a backlash against CICIG and
refused to extend its mandate, which ended in September
2019. Furthermore, Morales took a militarized hardline in
matters of security removing career officers from the top
echelons of the police as part of his move to weaken the
collaboration among national institutions and CICIG in the
fight against corruption. Guatemalan society was unable
to channel the resentment against grand corruption into
sustained momentum for political and police reform. Dur-
ing Morales’ administration (2016–2020) the “hidden forces”
were able to take back lost ground.
1.2. Community Oriented Policing as an Opportunity to
Further Police Reform
Even though reform has not taken hold of the Guatemalan
political system as a whole, the recent events narrated above
have allowed certain positive dynamics to develop at the
level of the institutions. A priced accomplishment is the
enhanced collaboration between police investigators and
Attorney General’s prosecutors which is arguably the main
reason behind the steep decline in homicidal violence since
2009. Enhanced capacities for crime investigation have
promoted professionalization within the police that open up
possibilities to consolidate a preventive approach to security
by developing its capacities for community-oriented policing.
COP means different things in different contexts but can
generally be conceptualized as “full-service personalized
policing where the same officer patrols and works in the
same area on a permanent basis, from a decentralized place,
working in a proactive partnership with citizens to identify
and solve problems” [12,13]. It can generally be considered
functional to police reform in that it “marks a shift in emphasis
[...] from reactive to preventive policing [...], from the police
as representing external coercion to police embedded in and
working in partnership with communities” [13].
Attempts have existed within the PNC to introduce
COP strategies since its first years of operation. A Sub-
directorate General for Crime Prevention (SDGPD [14])
was formed in the 2000s and specialized in working with
children, women, multicultural issues and fostering commu-
nity relations. Programs have included door to door visits
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to neighbors, presentations in schools, liaising with tradi-
tional authorities, and supporting local citizens’ committees.
Notable was an interinstitutional “Safe Schools” program
that kept educational premises open after-hours and during
weekends providing instructive and recreational activities
for young people [15]. These programs did not become
permanent in the institution, but provided experience and
stimulated discussions which, encouraged by donor sup-
port, led to consequential developments.
The PNC launched its most serious effort to date to insti-
tutionalize a preventive approach to security by sanctioning
the Integral Community Security Police Model (MOPSIC,
its Spanish acronym) in 2014. Its manual formulates the
MOPSIC as “[...] a model inspired on the community polic-
ing philosophy and police doctrine, oriented to provide a
quality service, based on timely and effective attention to cit-
izens’ demands for security and coexistence, starting from
the assignation of direct responsibilities to a work team
over a specific area to carry out prevention, dissuasion,
response, investigation and analysis activities. The model
is supported by new information and communications tech-
nologies that will assist in improving the management of
police services in an integral way. Its general objective is to
foment the professional capacity, police effectiveness and
trust relations with the community, to optimize police ser-
vice, reduce violence indicators and contribute to citizens’
peaceful coexistence” [16].
The MOPSIC sets out the values, norms, and con-
tributes tools for police practice to serve societal needs.
It provides guidelines to carry out all major aspects of polic-
ing from a perspective that is respectful of human rights. It
crucially introduces COP into the language and practice of
the PNC assigning responsibility for crime indicators to offi-
cers in charge of demarcations and provides data gathering
tools to design strategic approaches in different situations
of crime and violence.
A strength of the MOPSIC model is that it was devel-
oped with direct participation of the planning office of the
PNC, contributing to its appropriation on the part of the
police force. It is aligned to the political and legal framework
of the institution. Implementation of the MOPSIC model
was included in the PNC’s Strategic Plan 2014-2020 and
Government Decree 48-2014 reorganized stations and sub-
stations to respond to it. An institutional-wide effort to train
all units to adapt to MOPSIC principles has been in place
since its inception, admittedly with limited reach. The Sub-
directorate General of Studies and Doctrine is in charge
of mainstreaming MOPSIC into all police praxis, but its in-
troduction into the police academy’s syllabus has not fully
been realized yet.
The MOPSIC manual’s tools to study the situation of
crime in assigned districts include the Integral Format of
Police Activities (FIAPOL), that is used to plan work periods,
and the Statistical Analysis Format (FAES), used to sum-
marize and determine the security situation in a particular
territory. Each of the existing 130 stations are supposed
to have at least two analysts that compile and verify infor-
mation (not all of the 512 substations do, but stations cover
the same territory). With this information they formulate
a diagnostic of the security situation and plan responses
according to the level of gravity and resources at hand. The
strategy chosen may be mainly preventive, reactive or inves-
tigative in character. By 2020 all stations had an information
system of this kind in place, but the degree of actual imple-
mentation was not clear. Internet access continued to be
a big problem, which leads the police to favor the use of
off-line formats to save and share the data.
The SDGPD has been the champion for preventive ap-
proaches to security within the PNC since its creation in
the mid 2000’s. Its personnel carry out specific activities
with local organizations, but it is not them who are directly
in charge of the security situation in the communities. That
is the much larger Sub-Directorate General of Operations
(SDGO) which has only slowly adopted MOPSIC as it is per-
manently under the pressure to provide results in matters of
crime busts. The creation of a unit of “MOPSIC facilitators”
to train personnel in the substations to deal with the need to
encourage adoption of the model within the SDGO caused
some confusion as its functions overlapped with SDGPD’s
own Directorate of Community Relations (DIRC).
The PNC set up a team that included members of dif-
ferent parts of the institution to evaluate the initial imple-
mentation of MOPSIC. It showed that only 25 per cent of
substation in the Central District, where Guatemala City
and its metropolitan area are located, had been trained in
the MOPSIC manual by 2017. A new institutional assess-
ment effort was being carried out during 2019, but President
Morales’ obstructionist turn effectively halted the process
hindering the expected reforms.
The donor community has backed preventive strategies
in the police through the years, including the development
of MOPSIC. The U.S. has provided the largest amounts of
financial support through the Bureau of International Nar-
cotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) and the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID). The
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has provided
continuous technical support to the development of COP in
Guatemala including by training educators and higher-level
officers in Japan and Brazil since the 2000s. Other important
donors to the police include the Spanish Agency for Inter-
national Development Cooperation (AECID), the German
Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation (GIZ) and
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
Although the basis for a new understanding of polic-
ing in a democratic context is in place, patchy knowledge,
high turnover, and low trust encumber MOPSIC applica-
tion. The post-conflict context of Guatemala is not ideal
for the implementation of COP. The stakes are especially
high in metropolitan areas where homicidal violence, extor-
tion schemes and threats to physical integrity or life, mainly
coming from street-gang members, are common. If the per-
manent preoccupation of violence impacts police officers
in the United Kingdom, a country with one of the lowest
homicide rates in the world, in Guatemala, the “working per-
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sonality” of police officers is greatly affected by the stress
caused by potential violence. COP in Guatemala must take
into account its rich cultural diversity. Police agents and
officers have to adapt the general guidelines in the MOP-
SIC manual to the specific conditions of social organization
in places of implementation. Inter-cultural considerations
were not part of the original design and police agents are
scarcely trained in it.
Our research set out to identify the difficulties and the
opportunities that exist to further the implementation of
COP in specific territories. The material and methods for
the study are presented next, together with a description of
the sites of research and the criteria used for their selection.
2. Material, Methods and the Sites of Research
Research began with consultations and exploratory visits
to National Civilian Police sub-stations in Guatemala City
and La Antigua. Initial information and analysis were dis-
cussed in seminar-type meetings with experts, institutional
authorities and representatives of international donor enti-
ties during which the interest in studying the implementation
of the MOPSIC in contrasting contexts was defined. Even
though the police aspires to apply the same policies, in-
structions and manuals in all its stations in the country, the
results vary significantly from place to place with regards to
mechanisms of institutional articulation, police-community
collaboration and impact on security levels.
Qualitative sampling methods were used to identify Villa
Canales and Totonicapán as the sites for field research
(Figure4). Both were localities where the PNC was already
implementing MOPSIC but with very different attributes re-
lating to violence levels and social organization. Three
rounds of visits to each of the sites to carry out structured
and semi-structured interviews, participant observation and
focus groups took place from February 2017 to May 2018.
Rounds of interviews with experts and authorities transpired
throughout the period of research until August 2019.
Access to consult the local community in Totonicapán
required informing and obtaining acquiescence from the “48
Cantons” traditional indigenous organization. In Villa Canales
no special approval was required. Authorization to interview
members of the police precincts in Totonicapán and Villa
Canales was obtained through the PNC Sub-Director Gen-
eral for Crime Prevention who personally spoke with the
officers in charge in the territories to ensure our access.
Villa Canales is a metropolitan municipality in the vicinity
of Guatemala City that has experienced disorderly urban
grow, which has produced a demographically dense district
with uneven social organization. Villa Canales is one of the
most violent municipalities in the country with a homicide
rate of 37.0 per 100,000 (in 2019). Both main street gangs
(MS-13 and Barrio 18) are active in parts of the municipality.
Street robbery, usually violent, is common. Local narcotics
traffickers provide a kind of protection to the people living
around where they operate as in those places “there are no
thieves, the thief that shows up, dies” and [Sub-station chief
in down-town Villa Canales].
Villa Canales is part of the police district under respon-
sibility of Precinct 15 (Comisaría 15) which also covers the
neighboring municipalities of Villa Nueva, Amatitlán and
San Miguel Petapa, each with one station and a total of 18
substations to serve a population of 841,314 [2019 Census
Data]. Approximately 60 per cent of the 40,000 members of
the police work in the department of Guatemala where three
million people live; only 22 per cent of the population, but
also the place where most of violent crime occurs. Despite
the concentration of human resources in the metropolitan
region, personnel is still insufficient for patrols to cover per-
manently all of the territory. Villa Canales, having the largest
area of all municipalities in the department of Guatemala,
has distant villages that are hard for the police to reach.
In those places the PNC has established agreements with
local authorities for them to carry out surveillance activities
and inform the police if a problem comes up.
Totonicapán is a municipality in the western highlands of
Guatemala with urban and rural localities, low levels of crim-
inal violence and strong indigenous communal organization.
Situated 179 kilometers away from the capital, it is a rela-
tively autonomous region where traditional forms of indige-
nous local governance prevail, and where the community
demonstrates a clear ability to hold the police accountable.
Totonicapán is one of the most peaceful municipalities in
the country with a homicide rate of 2.4 per 100,000 in 2019.
Figure 4. Position of the municipalities sites of research.
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The eight municipalities that compose the department
of Totonicapán are under the responsibility of the PNC’s
precinct 44. The population of 418,569 is predominantly
rural and indigenous [17]. The precinct has 3 stations and
10 substations where 375 police people work, 43 of them
are women. The personnel is divided into three groups,
which work 7 days and are off during 4 days. The two active
groups relay service every 8 hours. The work force is insuffi-
cient to patrol the large territory in which many villages only
receive occasional visits from police patrols. Totonicapán
consistently shows at the bottom of the national crime rank-
ing. Homicide is exceptional in the department, but domestic
violence and land and water conflicts are common. In To-
tonicapán the police, and all other national institutions, must
coordinate their actions with the strong local governance
structures that are the de facto administrators of the territory.
Totonicapán has proved extraordinarily capable of keep-
ing away from the violent dynamics that have engulfed most
of the rest of the country throughout its history. During the
internal armed conflict the western highlands was the re-
gion most affected by military-perpetrated scorched-earth
strategy against the civilian population. Totonicapán was
a relative island of peace, affected by only one of the hun-
dreds of massacres that occurred from the late 1970’s to
the early 1990’s [1]. The strength of Totonicapán’s tradi-
tional governance institutions is credited for its communities’
capacity to avoid involvement with the guerrillas and to fend
off military encroachment [18].
Its proud history of resistance against the imposition of
external rule from Spanish colonialists and later from the
Guatemalan republic has preserved indigenous forms of
local administration. Indigenous authorities were officially
relegated to a second plane in the 19th century, however,
in Totonicapán, as in some other places in Guatemala, the
indigenous or “auxiliary mayors” continue to make most of
the decisions in villages, cantons and neighborhoods. An
assembly composed of the local representatives, termed
the “48 Cantons”, confers, negotiates and usually reaches
agreement with official Guatemalan state authorities, includ-
ing the National Civilian Police. The 48 Cantons adminis-
trate justice in cases of lesser gravity and mediate conflict
among communities and individuals [19].
All major local political decisions are taken by the 48 Can-
tons. It enjoys legitimacy among those it rules as it is based
on principles that originate in their Maya indigenous world
view. Its authorities are chosen for a limited period of time
and officiate in a spirit of service. They cease their usual
labor and the community provides for the material wellbeing
of their families during their time in office. The official-system
mayor, who is elected in the national elections, exists, but his
functions are limited to matters of infrastructure development
and management of a municipal police body.
3. Results
“Structures are important, but the substance of policing lies
in the rules, norms and values that guide police activities on
the ground” [20]. The MOPSIC in Guatemala intends to pro-
vide that needed guidance, but a long way to go remains for
its adequate application. An in-depth assessment of MOP-
SIC implementation in the territories of research follows, for
which the four basic elements that Frühling indicates define
COP are used. These are: 1) Police activities are planned
and carried out focusing on a small geographic area; 2)
strong relationships are established with the community to
facilitate an ongoing consultation process with citizens and
to ensure that their perspectives are considered; 3) the po-
lice focusses on solving concrete security issues affecting
local residents, instead of simply reacting when a crime
occurs; and 4) the police is involved in determining the con-
ditions and circumstances that favor offences perturbing the
daily life of residents and a course of action to overcome
them [4]. The section ends with a consideration of the con-
ditions for police accountability to develop and to foster trust
in the relations between the police and community.
Criteria #1: Police activities are planned and carried
out focusing on a small geographic area:
Most police people interviewed in Villa Canales said they
had heard about the MOPSIC and understood it implies
a change in the overall orientation of their work towards
meeting the security needs of the population they serve.
However, few of them had been specifically trained to im-
plement the manual. Even so, operational (SDGO) agents
implement on-foot patrols in limited areas of the central
urban parts of the municipality. The routes for patrolling
are assigned to couples of police people for each of the
8-hour periods they must be active. The agents visit local
shops and are ready to speak to the public, but it is preven-
tion (SDGPD) agents who continue to carry out the talks
at schools, churches and other local organizations. PNC
respondents indicated that their capacity to cover more terri-
tory is limited by a lack of personnel. Other local authorities
interviewed confirmed this opinion.
In Totonicapán the situation is similar, with patrolling
routes established and visits to local institutions. During
market days in Totonicapán the police patrol on foot and on
bicycles together with personnel from the municipal police
while a control room monitors surveillance cameras.
International cooperation projects have provided support
for the development of these initiatives in both municipalities,
including setting up surveillance systems of closed-circuit
cameras in the urban centers. Even if not all agents are
specifically trained for the implementation of the MOPSIC
manual, observation carried out in both municipalities per-
mit to assess this first criteria in an acceptable level. The
focus on small geographic areas is expected from the police
and there are instruments to guide its implementation.
Criteria #2: Strong relationships are established with
the community to facilitate an ongoing consultation pro-
cess with citizens and to ensure that their perspectives are
considered:
In Villa Canales station chiefs carry out formal meetings
with the mayor and his municipal council to report on the
situation of crime and the actions the police have taken.
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Meetings with the wider municipal development council
(COMUDE), which includes community leaders, occur only
occasionally. At lower levels police agents reported they
do carry out more frequent meetings with community de-
velopment councils (COCODEs) in the urbanized parts of
the municipality. The meetings are usually called for by the
local participatory organizations to forward requests which,
if necessary, are escalated to the municipal-level meetings.
Operational police agents usually share their personal mo-
bile telephone numbers to communicate directly with local
authorities.
Research detected that operational police people don’t
have sufficient training or tools with which to participate
proactively in these community spaces, but the communi-
cation channels are open to respond to emergencies. Villa
Canales residents interviewed for this study confirmed that
the police meet with the community and that they listen
to what they have to say even if they “are hit with a stick”’
when receiving criticism. Other signs of improved police-
community relations found during the research include the
carrying out of benefit activities that raise funds for the po-
lice. In 2017 the funds were used to repair the stations’
motorcycles.
Strong collaboration does take place with the municipal
police. This doesn’t occur everywhere, as it depends on
the mayor’s willingness to take on security responsibilities.
PNC agents expressed they feel supported by this collab-
oration as municipal bodies enjoy public acceptance and
can contribute vehicles, mainly motorcycles, that allow cou-
ples to carry out joint PNC—Municipal Police patrolling and
cover parts of the territory previously beyond their reach
[21]. They participate in potentially difficult tasks such as
enforcing limits to the hours during which alcohol-selling
shops can operate and provide breath tests that the PNC
doesn’t usually have. Although part of an elected body, the
municipal police is not representative of “the community” in
itself. Taking these elements into consideration, it can be
said that there is a basis on which to develop further the im-
plementation of criteria #2, although at the time of research
it was operational in Villa Canales only at a passable level.
The case is quite different in Totonicapán. The PNC
and other national institutions present in the department,
which include the Attorney General’s office, courts of law,
and the Indigenous and Women’s Defense office, meet on
a monthly basis with the 48 Cantons, the local governance
structure. Communication is permanent among both sides.
In the meetings the state institutions provide reports on
their activities and receive requests from the indigenous
authorities. The 48 Cantons control community surveillance
and preside the technical council on security.
The police’s work is contingent on the authority and con-
flict resolution mechanisms of the indigenous governance
structure. In a case of domestic violence, for example, the
aggrieved woman calls on the deputy auxiliary mayor, who
summons the husband to a communal session. Community
members can attend and intervene during the hearing while
the deputy mediates to reach a conciliatory agreement be-
fore the auxiliary mayor makes a decision. The police are
many times present in the meetings, but await the local
assembly’s resolution, “... sometimes we are there but it is
as if we weren’t because the people say: no, the auxiliary
mayor is the one in command here” [female police officer in
Totonicapán].
Members of the police interviewed acknowledged that
their support is requested by the community only when their
own mechanisms have been surpassed in their capacity to
resolve conflict. In such cases the police is called in, and if
necessary, asked to detain the accused person. The police
carries on from there in accordance to national legal proce-
dures. A justice-sector officer interviewed in Totonicapán
values the collaboration, “[the traditional authority system] is
effective. It solves cases in a considerable amount. If they
were not here, surely our work would be much harder””.
In some rural communities in Totonicapán the police
are not invited to participate in local conflict resolution pro-
cesses at all. The police accepts these arrangements. “We
have been respectful of their decisions to avoid increas-
ing tensions with the community” [Police Commissioner in
charge of Totonicapán’s departmental station]. Neverthe-
less, when the cases involve situations of serious violence,
like rape or injuries, the local authorities yield to the national
official system of justice.
The main apprehensions of the police have to do with
the risk of not being able to control a situation in which
the community takes “justice into its own hands”. Events
such as lynching of accused subjects have happened in
the past. At times, mobs, unsatisfied by the police’s effort
to preserve suspects’ physical integrity, have targeted the
police itself. But in general, police respondents expressed
that communication with community leaders has improved
with the implementation of the MOPSIC. This has been
a contribution for the communities to respect the rule of
law, allowing police people in Totonicapán to feel safer than
before.
Indigenous organization mechanisms together with
MOPSIC implantation have fostered mutual respect and
tolerance. A traditional authority in Totonicapán informed
that, “this year [the police] have provided support in all
what’s necessary and their treatment towards the popu-
lation has improved. Ten years ago, the police produced
fear in the community. The service is now more open, they
have a higher academic level, they are trained and practice
good human relations. The treatment towards the peo-
ple has improved as called for in the peace accords and
the [ILO’s] Convention 169” [Communal authority]. The re-
search revealed good opinions towards the police even
regarding gender-based violence. “Regarding violence
against women I perceive [the police] has good knowledge,
they are sensitized in that aspect. [...] I know of no woman
who has complained about it” [female local leader].
An independent party, the officer in charge of the At-
torney General’s office, corroborated that the police are
knowledgeable of international instruments such as the
ILO’s 169 convention and express respect to the rights
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of indigenous people based on it and on the Guatemalan
constitution. He indicates that despite the usual difficulty
in getting people to collaborate in national justice system
cases, most of which have to do with domestic violence in
Totonicapán, they are now more open to collaborate with
the police. “The improvement has not been dramatic but is
certainly visible” he said [local national officer].
Ceding some of its control to indigenous leaders may
raise concerns of possible marginalization of the police from
indigenous communities posing problems for individuals to
access the rule of law. Political anthropology has pointed
out that “state sovereignty [...] is being contested in new
and different ways as the boundary between state/non-state
in the exercise of clandestine and illegal forms of violence
becomes ever more blurred” in Guatemala [22], pp. 17-18).
But as long as mechanisms exist to “improve coordination
between community authorities and state justice officials
[a] wider struggle to secure recognition of indigenous au-
tonomy, to guarantee indigenous peoples’ collective and
individual human rights, and to limit violent community re-
sponses to crime” may be at work [22], pp. 17-18). Our
research identified that MOPSIC is beginning to provide a
previously inexistent mechanism to develop such coordina-
tion.
In general police people value highly the change MOP-
SIC has brought about in their approach to the communities.
A departmental PNC authority considers the opening up of
communication between the community and the police “...
to be the central axis of how to work, there is no other way
to go now” [Interview PNC authority in Totonicapán].
Nevertheless, as in Villa Canales, only some of the po-
lice officers interviewed have gone through training for the
implementation of the model and not all were knowledge-
able of MOPSIC as a cross-cutting philosophy for police
work. Even so, the fundamental orientation towards provid-
ing service to the needs of the community can be perceived
in the descriptions police interviewees provided of their
duties and their conception of their work. A Totonicapán
policeman shared his understanding of the new attitude the
police must pursue as “carrying out police activities with
a clear thought of providing help to the citizens in the first
place and developing trust in that way from the citizen who
will then provide the police with information to be used in pri-
oritizing the needs for prevention, investigation and control
of crime” [Interview PNC agent in Totonicapán].
Overall, the implementation of criteria number 2 can
be positively assessed in Totonicapán. Relations with the
community there can be said to be strong because of the
need of the police to coordinate closely with the local gover-
nance structure to be allowed to act. The PNC respects the
preeminence of the local system of authority over its own
and citizens’ perspectives are definitely considered. As in
Villa Canales, though, the police’s participation has a way
to go to become more proactive.
Criteria #3: The police forces focus on solving concrete
security issues affecting local residents, instead of simply
reacting when a crime occurs:
The National Civilian Police has the knowledge and
capacity to carry out sophisticated actions to deal with secu-
rity issues that affect well-defined areas. Task forces have
been established to identify and focus on high-incidence
communities where PNC experts interviewed have identi-
fied criminal profiles, patterns, and structures, that have
allowed them to put together actions to prevent crime ex-
ante based on criminal analysis. But these efforts have
remained limited experiences in certain places such as
Champerico, Chiquimula, Retalhuleu, and some zones of
the metropolitan area of Guatemala City. They have not
become sustained, institutionalized efforts.
During research, only limited development of this criteria
was observed in either of the municipalities, although there
is a clear understating of the need to do so. Respondents
acknowledged that the positive results in the reduction of
homicides that Villa Canales has achieved are owed to the
PNC’s strategy of posting police couples permanently at hot
spots where their analysis of past occurrences indicated
most killings took place. In Totonicapán the police credit the
combined use of technology and an accompanying commu-
nication campaign with an increase in security measures
taken by the population such as locking car doors and clos-
ing windows that achieved an important decrease in car
theft in the municipality. These are valuable examples, but
this kind of practice is not yet implemented permanently nor
throughout all of the national territory.
Criteria #4: The Police is involved in determining the
conditions and circumstances that favor offences perturbing
the daily life of residents and a course of action to overcome
them:
The MOPSIC manual provides the FIAPOL and FAES
tools to plan work periods and to gather information about
the security situation at the local level, but the persistence
of militarized approaches to the management of data harms
the implementation of these useful new instruments. The
way in which information management protocols are set
up in the PNC make it very difficult for police people at the
station level to be able to make systematic use of the infor-
mation they retrieve. The data goes through a convoluted
process of reporting upstream in the institution. Each of
the 133 stations produces “circumstance reports” (informe
circunstanciado) three times a day for the precincts, all
of which send a daily consolidated report to Guatemala
City headquarters. There, the Novedades unit assesses
the reliability of the information received, usually based on
the existence of a geographic reference for the events and
makes a decision if it becomes a “novelty report” (informe
de novedades) or not. This information then reaches the
PNC’s Chieftaincy of Planning (JEPEDI [23]) which enters
the information into its data base. High-ranking officers inter-
viewed acknowledge that much information is lost along the
way and that reports are produced for the almost exclusive
consumption of the highest command. This compartmen-
talized approach to information management reflects the
persistence of military-era practices in the police common
in other countries of Hispanic heritage. Exclusion from in-
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formation and knowledge are used as ways to accumulate
personal power. The cultural change it calls for will not
come about soon or easily.
Basic crime analysis products would increase the ca-
pacity of the police in the municipalities to prevent crime. At
the time of research mechanisms to deconcentrate the pro-
cess and provide information products to the field stations
were not being implemented. A police expert at one of the
research workshops said that he had heard station agents
refer to the use of the data gathering tools as having to “fill
out the little pages” without much conviction. Even if they
produce data, police at the station level are not systemat-
ically making use of it to plan crime prevention strategies,
much less together with the residents. Police staff at the
municipalities studied were mindful of the importance this
would have in strengthening their accountability mecha-
nisms towards the population but appeared incapable to
change the situation on their own. This fourth criterion for
COP assessment was found to be the weakest in the sites
where the investigation took place.
3.1. Accountability, Trust and Respect in
Police—Community Relations
At its most basic, police accountability has to do with the ex-
istence of information on the situation of crime and violence
at the local level and the capacity to respond directly to the
security issues that the community faces. It is increasingly
common for the National Civilian Police to inform about its
activities to the different levels of communal organizations
(social development councils at the departmental, municipal
and at times at the community level). The councils, though,
frequently ask for things from the police that it can’t provide,
such as dedicated patrol shifts, more vehicles and public
surveillance systems.
The lack of resources and the need to prioritize cases
based on their gravity are the main reasons why police of-
ficers say they fail to respond quickly to requests. In both
municipalities the principal material limitations that the po-
lice faces have to do with un-serviced patrols that break
down, insufficient amounts of fuel to have permanent mo-
bility, and unstable access to the internet in stations and
substations. Agents reported that having the permanent
possibility to search the internet to find addresses or to
send information would benefit their work significantly. Civil
society members in Villa Canales acknowledge the situa-
tion. “The problem is that [police officers] aren’t even issued
a telephone. They use their own. I have the officer’s num-
ber, and if I call him, I am sure he will answer” [Community
leader]. They are also cognizant of the rough conditions
of stations and substations where the police personnel eat
and sleep. They perceive this as a vulnerability that may
entail security risks. If the institution is not providing decent
working conditions, some elements of the personnel may
become susceptible to lure from criminals.
On average, communities reported middling levels of
trust in the police, but acknowledged this to be an improve-
ment from five or ten years ago. Those who expressed
the traditional mistrust towards the institution usually had
less direct relation to the police. They tended to consider
insufficient the efforts that the PNC carries out to approach
the population pointing out that not all police people are well
informed, trained or motivated to carry out a COP approach.
Even in such cases the informants recognized that a few
notable incidents of police misbehavior affect the whole of
the institution disproportionately. The police resent the bad
reputation that “a few black sheep” have created for the
institution as a whole.
Police interviewees blame lack of crime reporting from
the community to be a central obstacle to their work. Many
people, after the police has responded to their call and
arrested the suspect, fail to follow through with the formal
complaint. Even if for understandable reasons, that is the
cause for which many suspects go free soon after being
detained. This notwithstanding, they also expressed that
the incipient levels of trust that are being developed have
allowed access to information in certain cases that would
not have been possible before.
Even though levels of trust are still low, members of
the community recognize that the limitations with which the
police operate affect the results of their work. “People have
little trust in [the police], but it is because many don’t know
the penury they endure and the situations in which they can
intervene and those where they can’t. The police do its work
and do all they can. But, in the event of a theft, they grab the
thief, but the thief has nothing on him of what he’s accused
of having stolen. The judge can’t accuse him of anything
and lets him go. And who is to blame? The police! And it’s
not them to be blamed. There are ways to understand why
things happen” [local leader in Villa Canales].
Those that are part of community organizations such
as the Municipal Commission for Violence Prevention
(COMUPRE) or the Network of Derivation of victims in
Villa Canales have had the opportunity to collaborate with
the police more closely and showed more appreciation of
improvement in the police’s attitude and capacities. Civil
society members in Villa Canales recognize that the disor-
derly urban growth of the municipality has increased risks
of crime and violence, making the police’s work much more
difficult in recent years. A local leader in Villa Canales says:
“They are overwhelmed, they want to, but they can’t, the
population doesn’t allow them to. Now I feel that the lack of
credibility in the PNC affects them” [Member of civil society
in Villa Canales].
On the side of the police, the research frequently found
motivation to foster the orientation towards the community.
Police respondents value the possibilities that increased
contact with the communities allows them to convey the
reasons for their inability to respond with the speed that the
population wants. “I can explain to the man or woman at
the meeting that my sector has only one vehicle to patrol...”
said a police officer in Villa Canales. An operational agent
shared his enthusiasm about the improvement in the rela-
tions with the community, “we feel like super-stars when a
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child says hello to us and says he wants to be a policeman
when he grows up. [We] are changing the perception of
rigidity, our actions allow the citizens to believe in the police,
to trust it, and that translates in the people telling us what
is going on, and so we can act and solve their problems.
[...] We have changed, from repressive police into a friendly
one, into a community police with international standards
that we will pursue as we reach maturity as an institution.
We are only 20 years old, an adult age, but more years
are needed, and we can continue to improve” [Operational
agent in Villa Canales].
Even administrative police personnel in Totonicapán un-
derstand their work contributes to the overall objective of
closer cooperation with the communities served. An office-
based female police agent shared that, “in the administrative
area we set in each weekly plan [for operational person-
nel] visits to at least three parishes, three commercial sites,
three public schools, three private schools and three banks
or companies. This makes me ‘communitarian’ because
I am providing strategies for our personnel to reach out
into other municipalities for all of us to work in harmony”
[administrative agent in Totonicapán].
The research shows that the opportunity exists for lo-
cal community organizations, such as the COMUPRES, to
become stronger in pressuring police officers in charge to
carry on with good planning and joint implementation that
has existed. “We have seen that if we let the police on their
own it is total chaos, but if we are friends with them, if we
become strategic allies, putting pressure on them, motivat-
ing the people to report, we can achieve much” [civil society
leader in Villa Canales].
This is what happens already in Totonicapán, where the
police willingly yield its authority to that of local traditional
governance structures. It would be too much to ask from the
PNC to develop from this an integral multicultural approach
to policing in the short-term, but the foundation to ensure
that the attitude is not one of mere tolerance due to relative
weakness, but effectively one of intercultural respect, is al-
ready in place. The fact that those that have worked directly
with the police have more nuanced opinions about the insti-
tution, even in the high-violence and disorderly context of
Villa Canales, is an initial base on which to build stronger
trust relations into the future.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
As previously acknowledged, political circumstances are
paramount determinants of the possibilities for reform. Re-
cent literature calls attention to the electoral disadvantage to
officeholders and the complications from dealing with inter-
nal power structures that promoting police reform may pose
[24]. In Guatemala, even though the police remain at the
disposition of venal political elites, a “robust opposition” and
“electoral counterweights” are not factors that determine re-
form outcomes. The old guard of officers trained during the
conflict-era National Police is beginning to retire and with it
resistance to reform. That very old guard, although it may
have collaborated with criminal bodies such as the CIACS,
didn’t lead them. It never attained a corporative structure
with specific interests to defend as in other countries.
Although ever-present, pressure towards militarization
of the police has not overrun the institution. It is true military
or former military personnel continue to be appointed to
posts of responsibility in the security sector. But militarized
policing strategies have come up in Guatemala when spe-
cific security situations have overwhelmed politicians urging
them to provide a heavy-handed response. Army involve-
ment in patrols ended in 2018 in compliance of conditions
for aid set by the U.S. Congress. Moreover, Guatemalan
society has not succumbed to the high degrees of punitive
populism observed in neighboring countries. Law proposals
to officially label street-gangs as terrorists and the candi-
dacy of Zury Ríos [25], who ran on reactivating the use of
the death penalty, have been unsuccessful. In spite of the
heavy influence from the military, the PNC has been able to
avoid complete overtake, not least through sustaining the
effort to strengthen community-oriented policing strategies.
Bonner is right to point out that “[t]he authoritarian na-
ture of policing per se and the protection by Latin American
and Caribbean governments of highly inegalitarian societies
specifically, stand against the prospect of COP being a flag-
ship of societal democratization” [26]. There are times in
which the inequitable social structure calls on state forces
to control conflict for which the political system is underde-
veloped to deal with. This happens when the police evict
landless peasants from the holdings of agricultural indus-
tries or when protesters against the diversion of rivers are
met with repression. At those times the police carry out the
orders from the powers that be and act against the popula-
tion if necessary. In such cases, the relation between the
police and the community is completely adversarial and oc-
curs in an impersonal manner. But those are extraordinary
moments of intense crisis. As this research shows, the re-
lation between the police and the community usually takes
place under different circumstances in Guatemala. In Toton-
icapán the police are truly at the service of a well-organized
community, and in Villa Canales the police are many times
yet another actor under the same insecurity strains that
the local population endures. At such local scale, a set of
limited goals, like reduced crime, lower violence and peace-
ful coexistence can certainly be fostered through stronger
collaboration between the community and the police.
In day-to-day life in Guatemalan municipalities, the
police seem to be less alienated from the community than
in other countries where formal COP program implemen-
tation is more advanced. Although the criticisms posed
in the Ombudsman’s national report regarding transgres-
sions by the police are true and his recommendations
valuable, it must also be pointed out that he has not had
the need to call for extraordinary measures in containment
of police abuse in recent years [27]. There is no identified
trend in high-violence repression recurrently used by the
police in Guatemala. This is in sharp contrast to Brazil
or neighboring El Salvador, where processes of police
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reform are severely hindered by gruesome levels of police
violence [28].
Guatemalan cultural diversity emerges as a special op-
portunity for COP. Alienation between the police and com-
munity is not complete in Guatemala. The respect or toler-
ance for local forms of governance that exists in places like
Totonicapán could be turned into multicultural policing policy.
COP provides the mechanisms for a joint consideration of
what “security” can mean for both sides, so they become
intelligible to each other and can agree on shared values
such as peaceful coexistence, respect among groups, and
also respect among individuals. Increased contact with the
community to share information, analyze and plan together
with the population and begin implementing COP strate-
gies will contribute to increase accountability. When dealing
with local-level security issues the opportunity exists for
common understandings, goal setting and meaning to be
constructed.
To expect text-book implementation of community-
oriented policing strategies in Guatemala is like trying to
make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear. The force has re-
mained understaffed, badly managed and insufficiently
trained. It is a new institution that has existed in a context
of political and criminal meddling in its affairs and over-
whelmed with demands to deal with crime and violence.
However, the improvement in matters of criminal investi-
gation attained during the past decade and a half has de-
veloped institutional capacities, stalled the rise of impunity
and dramatically brought down homicide rates. An under-
current of champions for preventive approaches supported
by international donors achieved the sanctioning of MOP-
SIC as institutional policy. Even if slow and incomplete,
the implementation of the MOPSIC method is producing
positive outcomes thanks to the improved communication
and increasing trust levels from the citizens.
The development of criminal investigation capacities
during the past 15 years in the justice and security sector
spurred professionalism and has stimulated reform of the
police, even if incomplete. Improved inter-institutional col-
laboration on criminal investigations is considered to be the
main reason for the significant decrease in the homicide
rate observed since 2009 in Guatemala. This momentous
achievement shows that the police can be a part of positive
change at the societal level. The opportunity to further po-
lice reform by developing the other main aspect of policing,
crime prevention, is now open with the sanctioning of MOP-
SIC in 2014. Research results show that there is a basis on
which to build stronger relations between the police and the
community in Guatemala.
Professionalized officers, many of whom have obtained
university degrees, are rising to leadership roles in the PNC.
They have fostered processes of intra-institutional analysis
that were the base for strategic plans drafted in the 2010’s.
They include many of the champions for the preventive
approach to security that have appropriated the COP phi-
losophy and were fundamental to achieve the sanctioning
of MOPSIC in 2014. Although not a majority and working
under conditions of scant resources and counter-reformist
pressures, these groups are favorable to further develop
public-centered approaches to security and are bastions
against re-militarization.
Both former Police Reform Commissioners interviewed
identified the need to dignify police people’s working circum-
stances and increase their levels of education to achieve
a better implementation of the new model. Mainstream-
ing the MOPSIC, not only in training new recruits in COP
philosophy, but sustaining the effort to train active agents.
In this, the Sub-directorate General of Studies and Doc-
trine, to which the Police Academy belongs, should take
the leading role and contribute to develop the intellectual
autonomy necessary to move away from the simplicity of
military language and practice in the institution.
More must be done to engage the general public with
regards to the importance of changing the repressive un-
derstanding of security that pervades Guatemalan society.
Informing about what MOPSIC’s objectives, planning and
execution of projects and activities are can help to explain
the changes in the philosophy and approach to policing that
are taking place and prompt higher levels of trust and coop-
eration. This is to be understood as a long-term endeavor,
but it may be the point of entry to the real fight for human
security against repressive, authoritarian approaches of the
past.
There are, of course, special challenges to be faced
with regards to the penetration of organized crime in the
police. Internal control mechanisms have proven incapable
of eradicating corrupt practices. At the local level it has not
been uncommon for mayors and local police chiefs to be
involved with narcotics traffickers. It is very hard for police
people to pass polygraph tests when asked if they have
abused their positions at any time. These are very serious
problems that affect not only the police, but by the whole of
the Guatemalan governmental establishment. As described
above, Guatemala has shown it is capable to respond to
grand corruption when its public organizes, but this has
only been possible when adequate international support
has been in place as was the case during the existence of
CICIG, which conservative forces effectively held back. The
recent election of Joseph Biden as president of the United
States is set to change the situation. He has given clear
signs that the fight against corruption and the strengthening
of democratic institutions will regain central importance in
the relation between the U.S. and the Northern Triangle of
Central America. This will include the establishment of new,
smarter and more effective mechanisms to go up against
corruption and renewed support to police reform, including,
centrally, community-oriented policing.
The security situation is generally perceived not be dete-
riorating at this time in Guatemala. The professionalization
of career officers, an increasing understanding of the phi-
losophy of community policing and international support
are the best chance to further police reform. These are
elements on which to continue building on that the PNC
and Guatemalan society must not squander.
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